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opyright # 2009 John Wiley & SonCÍCERO PEREIRA1,2*, JORGE VALA1 AND RUI COSTA-LOPES1
1Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa,
Portugal
2Pontifı́cia Universidade Católica de Goiás, BrasilAbstract
This research analyses the mediational role of threat perception in the relationship between prejudice and discrimination
(opposition to immigration and opposition to naturalization of immigrants). In the first study, using representative samples
in 21 European countries (N¼ 36 566) from European Social Survey (2002), we showed that the relationship between
prejudice and opposition to immigration was more strongly mediated by realistic than by symbolic threat perceptions. In
Study 2, using representative samples in two countries with different traditions of immigration (Switzerland, N¼ 940;
Portugal, N¼ 1514), we showed that realistic threat more strongly mediated the relationship between prejudice and
opposition to immigration, while only symbolic threat perception mediated the link between prejudice and opposition to
naturalization. The theoretical implications of considering threat perceptions as factors that legitimize discrimination are
discussed. Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Research on the relationship between prejudice and discrimination (e.g. Lord, Lepper, & Mackie, 1984; McConahay,
1983; Smith & Dixon, 1968; Weitz, 1972) has been carried out within the more general framework of the early studies on
the connection between attitude and behaviour (e.g. Kutner, Wilkins, & Yarrow, 1952; LaPiere, 1934; Wicker, 1969).
While the literature on the relationship between attitude and behaviour specifies when attitudes predict behaviour (e.g.
Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Zanna, Olson, & Fazio, 1980) and presents some hypotheses on how this process occurs (e.g.
Fazio, 1990; Snyder, 1982; for a review, see Eagly & Chaiken, 1998), the literature on the prejudice–discrimination link
still reveals some shortcomings in these matters (see Fiske, 1998, 2000, for a review). In fact, the few studies concerning
thewhen question have shown that the prejudice–discrimination correlation has a moderate magnitude (Dovidio, Brigham,
Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996), and that this correlation depends on several moderators (Schutz & Six, 1996). To our
knowledge, only the model proposed by Pereira, Vala, and Leyens (2009) has addressed the how question, predicting that
the psychological processes through which preconceived attitudes lead to discriminatory behaviour involve justifying
factors, such as threat perception. In fact, Pereira et al. experimentally showed that symbolic threat perceptionmediates the
relationship between infra-humanization of Turkish people and the opposition to the adhesion of Turkey to the European
Union (EU). The current paper extends Pereira et al.’s findings by testing whether distinct types of threats differentially
mediate the relationship between prejudice and discrimination. Specifically, we tested the hypothesis that the relationship
between prejudice and opposition to immigration in Europe is more strongly mediated by realistic threat (Studies 1 and 2)
and that the relationship between prejudice and opposition to naturalization is more strongly mediated by symbolic threat
(Study 2).Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa, Avenida Professor Anı́bal de Bettencourt, 9, Lisboa, 1600–
s, Ltd.
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1232 Cı́cero Pereira et al.Legitimizing the Prejudice–Discrimination Relationship
The role of legitimizing factors has often been outlined in the literature on prejudice and discrimination. Allport (1954)
underlined the importance of justifying factors, mainly stereotypes, in understanding the nature of intergroup bias, and
Tajfel (1984) pointed out the same legitimizing factors of intergroup tensions and social asymmetries. The psychological
function of justifying factors such as stereotypes has been empirically shown (e.g. Rutland & Brown, 2001; Yzerbyt,
Rocher, & Schadron, 1997), but there are few studies on the role played by justifications in the relationship between
prejudice and discrimination. Nonetheless, some theoretical models seem to conceptually support our proposal. For
instance, research on aversive racism found that the availability of a non-racist justification facilitates the expression of
discrimination by aversive racists (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). An explanation to such an effect has been proposed within
the justification–suppression model of prejudice (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003), which suggests that people hold genuinely
prejudiced beliefs even though they may have internalized unprejudiced values and norms. Since prejudice is usually
suppressed by anti-prejudiced norms, personal standards, beliefs and values, its expression depends on a justification that
allows the individual to express prejudice without being sanctioned. System justification theory explains that this is
possible because there is a general motive to justify the status quo and to bolster the legitimacy of the existing social order
(Jost & Banaji, 1994). According to social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), justifications may occur through
legitimizing myths, i.e. ideologies used by people to legitimate social hierarchies. Because these myths maintain the
hegemony of dominant groups over dominated groups, they function as justifications for opposition to policies that benefit
minority groups.
In line with these views, we propose that, in democratic contexts, discrimination is facilitated by the accessibility of a
justification seen as unprejudiced (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). The reasoning is that this justification helps individuals to
resolve the social and psychological conflicts that derive from, on the one hand, the display of prejudiced behaviour, and,
on the other hand, the need to be viewed as unprejudiced (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). We propose this happens through a
psychological mechanism based on the general motive of justification (Jost & Banaji, 1994), which leads people to look for
legitimizing myths to support existing social arrangements (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Extending this process to contribute
to the understanding of the relationship between prejudice and discrimination, we build on the idea that prejudice can elicit
the search for justifications to legitimize discrimination. Specifically, we consider that the higher the prejudice, the higher
should be the motivation to use legitimizing myths as justifications for discriminatory behaviour, i.e. we deem the
relationship between prejudice and discrimination to be mediated by these justifications (Pereira et al., 2009).The Justifying Role of Realistic and Symbolic Threat Perception on the Support to Discriminatory Policies
Against Immigrants
Realistic and symbolic threat perceptions constitute examples of justifications for discrimination. Realistic threats are
threats to the existence, the (economic and political) power and the (physical or material) well being of the ingroup.
Symbolic threats are related to differences between groups in terms of values, morals and standards and how these
differences challenge the ingroup’s worldview (Stephan et al., 2002). The idea that threat constitutes a justification of
discrimination is not in itself a new one (see Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). In fact, one of the first analyses of the justifying
role of threat perception in intergroup attitudes was carried out by LaPiere (1936) in his research on the explanations given
by the inhabitants of Fresno County, California, to justify their antipathy towards Armenian immigrants. LaPierre found
that threat perception was the main reason invoked to explain intergroup antipathy. This study is particularly important
because it presents threat perception as a justifying factor deriving from a negative attitude towards the out-group. The
association between (symbolic and realistic) threat and prejudiced attitudes has been exhaustively analysed by several
theories and models, such as the group position theory (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999), the realistic group conflict theory
(LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966), the instrumental model of group conflict (Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998),
the sociofunctional threat-based approach (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), and the integrated threat theory of prejudice
(Stephan &Renfro, 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Correlational studies have supported these models showing that both
realistic (e.g. Bobo, 1983; Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001; Quillian, 1995; Stephan et al., 2002) and
symbolic threat (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears & Henry, 2003; Stephan et al., 2002)
predict prejudice. However, even though longitudinal studies have shown that general threat feelings cause dislike towardsCopyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 1231–1250 (2010)
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Prejudice and discrimination 1233outgroups (Schlueter, Schmidt, & Wagner, 2008), the causal relation between symbolic or realistic threat and prejudice is
not yet fully supported (for a meta-analysis, see Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). In fact, it is possible that prejudice can
instead predict realistic and symbolic threats because prejudice might lead people to see outgroup members as a threat to
the ingroup. In addition, it is likely that the more an outgroup is seen as a threat, the more justifiable discriminatory
behaviour against members of this outgroup would appear to be (e.g. Pereira et al., 2009). Hence, threat perceptions should
have a mediating role in the relationship between prejudice and discrimination.
Indeed, this threat perception should be a mediator in the relationship between prejudice and discrimination since it can
be regarded as a justifying factor of discrimination (see Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; LaPiere, 1936), especially when the
social context condemns discrimination. Pereira et al. (2009) provided experimental support for this hypothesis by
manipulating an infra-humanized representation of Turkish people, i.e. the denial of uniquely human essences to the
outgroup (Leyens et al., 2000). They showed (Study 1) that an infra-humanized representation influenced participants’
opposition to Turkey’s adhesion to the EU. More importantly, Pereira et al. found that the psychological process through
which this effect occurred involved a symbolic threat perception. In this sense, symbolic threat mediated the relationship
between infra-humanization and opposition to Turkey’s entry into the EU. Furthermore, when participants were placed in
an egalitarian normative context (Study 2), they experienced a dilemma and used symbolic threat as a justification for
discrimination. This dilemma was absent when the prevalent norms were permissive (i.e. meritocratic). In such a context,
no justification was needed to discriminate. Pereira et al. interpreted these effects based on the idea that, if discrimination
against minority groups still persists in democratic societies, even under the pressure of a normative standard that
condemns prejudiced attitudes, it must then be psychologically incoherent to discriminate against other groups based on
prejudice. Thus, in these societies, the relationship between prejudice and discrimination needs to be justified in order to
re-establish this ‘psychological coherence’.
Pereira et al.’s (2009) experiments provided internal validity for the mediating role of threat perceptions. The current
paper extends Pereira et al.’s work in at least three ways: (a) We use representative samples obtained in several European
countries in order to provide external validity for the mediating role of threat perception, (b) we show how different types
of discrimination require different types of justifications (i.e. symbolic or realistic threat perception) and (c) we use a
traditional operationalization of prejudice, i.e. a negative attitude towards outgroups (see Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 2009).
We consider two types of discrimination that reflect two political measures that are directly linked to discrimination
against immigrants: The proposals to reduce immigrant numbers and to make naturalization more difficult. Opposition to
immigration has been more closely connected to the idea that immigrants represent both an economic and a security threat,
i.e. this opposition is recurrently linked more to the realistic (e.g. Bobo, 1988; Esses et al., 2001) than to the symbolic
threat, even though symbolic aspects (such as differences in group values) have also been shown to be positively correlated
with support for anti-immigration policies (e.g. Esses et al., 1993; Stephan, Renfro, Esses, Stephan, & Martin, 2005). The
psychological principle activated is that people feel threatened because they think that if migration flows increase,
competition for scarce resources and crime rates will also increase (Bobo, 1988; Quillian, 1995). Thus, realistic threat may
be an important justification for opposition to immigration.
Opposition to naturalization may also involve concerns with realistic aspects since naturalization is objectively related
to the increasing of civil, labour and political rights for those who acquire it, providing them with a similar or even equal
status to the one native citizens enjoy. Nevertheless, restriction on naturalization may be linked to the protection of cultural
aspects of the host society and to the defence of a unique identity, distinct from all others. In other words, opposition to
naturalization may involve symbolic threat because if the host country adopts a policy facilitating the naturalization of
immigrants (i.e. if it turns ‘them’ into ‘us’), people might infer that, as time goes by, the values and traditions that define
their country’s cultural identity could be ‘contaminated’ and ‘altered’ by mixing it with the values and traditions
characterizing the cultural identity of the naturalized people. People may then believe this brings ingroup distinctiveness
into question, which is a fundamental aspect in the understanding of ‘intergroup’ hostility (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears,
& Doosje, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Ullrich, Christ, & Schlüter, 2006). Thus, symbolic threat may also be an important
justifying factor in opposition to naturalization.
To sum up, when we think about the popular discourse about immigrants and immigration, we notice that it is also
structured along these two fundamental lines. The first one refers to identity aspects such as immigrants’ different culture,
how they resemble (or not) the host society members in terms of personality features, or how native citizens feel about the
way immigrants ‘rear their children’. The second one refers to the fact that these immigrants may or may not be ‘affecting
the economy’ and the individual native citizen’s personal financial situation, and how they are ‘taking jobs away’ fromCopyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 1231–1250 (2010)
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immigration is organized according to these two factors, it is quite plausible to think that these two types of factors
(symbolic and realistic) will differentially affect discriminatory attitudes towards immigrants. In order to analyse this
hypothesis, we carried out two studies.Study 1
The aim of this study was to analyse the mediating role of justifications in the relationship between prejudice and
discrimination. We measured justifications in terms of perceived realistic and symbolic threat. Discrimination was
operationalized as opposition to immigration. According to our hypotheses, if threat perception justifies the relationship
between prejudice and discrimination, then the effect of prejudice on opposition to immigration should be mediated by
threat perception. Furthermore, the link between prejudice and opposition to immigration should be more strongly
mediated by realistic threat because the issues concerning opposition to immigration are recurrently associated (in the
public discourse) with increased competition for scarce resources and problems connected with crime rates and safety (e.g.
Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999; Vala, Pereira, & Ramos, 2006).
The analysis was carried out in three phases. First, we tested the mediation hypothesis. Second, we analysed the
proposed model’s goodness-of-fit, and compared it with the adjustment of two alternative models. In the first alternative
model, prejudice was specified as a consequence of threat perception (e.g. Stephan et al., 2002). In the second alternative
model threat perception was specified as a consequence of opposition to immigration1, i.e. threat perception would be a
rationalization for discrimination in the sense that it follows and not precedes discriminatory behaviour. In the third phase,
we tested the hypothesis that the mediation role of threat perception occurs in countries with clearly different immigration
policies. In order to test the invariance of the model’s structural parameters between countries with very different policies
of immigration, we compared the model’s fits using samples from France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Indeed,
based on Bourhis, Moise, Perreault, and Senecal’s (1997) typology of ‘ideologies of integration’, Vala et al. (2006)
proposed that those countries exemplify three historically different paradigms of immigrant integration coherent with
these ideologies: France represents an assimilation paradigm induced by the ‘French republican ideology’, Germany
depicts the ‘separation’ paradigm and the United Kingdom exemplifies a version of ‘mitigated integration’ paradigm (see
also Kivisto, 2002). Despite these different ideologies of integration, we hypothesized that the proposed model would
work equally well among these countries. Therefore, we tested the structural parameters invariance in a multi-group
analysis because we consider that the use of justifications is necessary in every democratic country or in any other context
where egalitarian values are prominent and, therefore, threat should work as a mediator of the relationship between
prejudice and opposition to immigration in all these countries.Method
Participants We used the European Social Survey database (ESS-Round 1, Jowell & Central Co-ordinating Team,
2003)2, and selected the probabilistic representative samples in 21 European countries, which amounted to 39 860
participants. We excluded from the analysis those participants who identified themselves as immigrants or who had not
been born in the country where the data were collected. This procedure reduced the sample to 36 566 participants that
represents the population aged 15 years and older of these 21 countries3.1We kindly acknowledge the suggestion made by one of the reviewers on this matter.
2The ESS is an international academic research project, the aim of which is to carry out a systematic study of the values, attitudes, beliefs and behaviour
patterns within and between European countries. Every 2 years, representative samples of the countries involved fill out this questionnaire. In 2005 the
ESS received the European Union Descartes Prize for the Social Sciences for the high quality of their database and for the rigorous methodological
procedure used in sampling and measurement of the variables.
3To avoid bias in the sampling process, the ESS-1 database provides twoweighting factors, design weight (dweight) and population weight (pweight). The
dweight corrects errors in the selection of each individual, balancing the selection probabilities of all those making up the sample. The pweight adjusts the
country samples so that the differences in sample sizes correspond to the differences in the sizes of their respective populations. To guarantee that the two
types of bias were controlled, the pweight was combined with the dweight (i.e. pweight dweight¼ pdweight). Therefore, in the analyses carried out in
each country, we used dweight, whilst for analyses involving all the countries, or in comparisons between them, we used pdweight.
Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 1231–1250 (2010)
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Prejudice and discrimination 1235Prejudice Measure ESS-1 includes two indicators classically used to measure blatant prejudice (e.g. Pettigrew &
Meertens, 1995). Participants ware asked to think about people from another country, race or ethnic group seen as different
from the majority of citizens in their country. They were then asked to indicate to what extent they would be upset if one of
these people ‘were appointed as your boss’ (P-item 1) or ‘married a close relative of yours’ (P-item 2). The answers varied
from 0 (I would not mind at all) to 10 (I would mind a lot).
Realistic Threat Measure Two indicators were used to measure realistic threat perception: One for security threat and
another one for economic threat. These indicators reflect the realistic threat definition as considered in most studies on
threat perception (e.g. Esses et al., 1998; Riek et al., 2006; Stephan et al., 2002). The indicator of security threat was as
follows: ‘Are [country]’s crime problems made worse or better by people coming to live here from other countries? The
answers vary from 0 (crime problems made better) to 10 (crime problems made worse), so that higher scores indicate a
greater perception of threat to security. The indicator of economic threat is a composed index of the following six items:
‘Average wages and salaries are generally brought down by people coming to live and work here’; ‘People who come to
live and work here generally harm the economic prospects of the poor more than the rich’; ‘People who come to live and
work here help to fill jobs where there are shortages of workers’; ‘Would you say that people who come to live here
generally take jobs away from workers in [country], or generally help to create new jobs?’; ‘Most people who come to
live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you think people who come here
take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out?’; ‘Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s
economy that people come to live here from other countries?’ The answers to the first three indicators varied from 1 (agree
strongly) to 5 (disagree strongly), while answers to the final three varied from 0 (major threat) to 10 (minor threat). When
necessary, we reversed these answers so that higher scores would indicate greater threat. A factorial analysis was carried
out on the answers to these items. Only one factor was extracted explaining 45% of the variance (eigenvalue¼ 2.71;
loadings varying from .38 to .77). Also importantly, only one factor was extracted for each country. We then standardized
these scores in order to calculate the composed index of economic threat (Cronbach’s a¼ .74 for total sample; Cronbach’s
a varying from .70 to 78 between countries).
Symbolic Threat Measure ESS-1 has one indicator to measure the perception of symbolic threat: ‘Would you say that
[country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?’ The
answers vary from 0 (cultural life enriched) to 10 (cultural life undermined), so that higher scores would indicate greater
perception of symbolic threat. This indicator operationalizes the core features of symbolic threat as a feeling that the
simple presence of another group jeopardizes the ingroup’s values and traditions that define its cultural life (e.g. Sears &
Henry, 2003; Stephan et al., 2002).
Opposition to Immigration Measure Two indicators were used. Participants were asked to indicate to what extent
they thought their country ‘should allow people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country nationality] people
to come and live here?’ (OI-item 1) and ‘should allow people from the poorer countries outside Europe to come and live
here?’ (OI-item 2). The answers were registered on a scale ranging from 1 (allow many to come and live here) to 4 (allow
none).
Results
In this study (as in Study 2), hypotheses were tested on a series of structural equation models estimated on the variance–
covariance matrix of the indicators that was obtained using pairwise deletion for missing data. Initially, we estimated
the parameters of the model for the whole sample considering all countries. We then repeated the procedure within
each individual country. In all the analyses, parameters were estimated according to the method of maximum
likelihood.
Preliminary Analyses Table 1 presents the descriptive statistic and the correlations between the indicators used. All
the correlations are positive ranging from weak to strong. The strongest correlations are between the items used as
indicators of the latent variables of the model. The correlations between the indicators of different latent variables are only
moderate, which indicates that they are measuring different constructs, avoiding any multicolinearity issues. However,
there are substantial correlations between the indicator of symbolic threat perception and those of realistic threat
perception, suggesting that, as a whole, these items may be measuring only one latent variable. We assume that althoughCopyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 1231–1250 (2010)
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Table 1. Means, standard deviations and correlation matrix of the items used in Study 1
Items M SD
Correlation matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prejudice
P-item 1 (1) 3.18 3.19
P-item 2 (2) 3.50 3.35 .74
Realistic threat
Economic threat index (3) 0.00 0.67 .36 .33
Security threat item (4) 6.81 2.07 .19 .21 .43
Symbolic threat item (5) 4.42 2.41 .36 .35 .54 .34
Opposition to immigration
OI-item 1 (6) 2.48 .82 .39 .38 .50 .31 .44
OI-item 2 (7) 2.48 .82 .36 .36 .49 .30 .44 .83
Note: Correlation matrix’s diagonal was omitted. All coefficients are significant at p< .001.
1236 Cı́cero Pereira et al.realistic and symbolic threats are strongly related concepts, each taps a different aspect of threat perception with distinct
functions in the justification of discrimination.
To test this hypothesis, we conducted a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) with the indicators of threat perception in
which we specified a solution with two correlated latent variables (symbolic threat and realistic threat). We compared the
goodness-of-fit of this solution with the goodness-of-fit of a unifactorial solution4. Results indicate a strong correlation
between the factors (r¼ .52, p< .001) on the bi-factorial solution with the followings fit indices: x2(1,
N¼ 33038)¼ 1140.98, p< .001, CFI¼ .94, GFI¼ .98, AGFI¼ .87, RMSEA¼ .19, AIC¼ 1150.80. Results of the
unifactorial solution show an unsatisfactory goodness-of-fit: x2(2, N¼ 33038)¼ 4424.75, p< .001, CFI¼ .76, GFI¼ .93,
AGFI¼ .78, RMSEA¼ .26, AIC¼ 4432.75. In fact, the bi-factorial solution shows better fit than the unifactorial one,Dx2(1,
N¼ 33038)¼ 3283.77, p< .001. Thus, the solution that specifies symbolic threat perception as a latent variable different
from realistic threat perception is more appropriate than the solution that specifies threat perception as a single factor.
We also used CFA in order to check the construct validity of the proposed measurement model. In this model, we
specified four conceptual latent variables (i.e. prejudice, realistic threat, symbolic threat and opposition to immigration)
that were allowed to correlate. In order to guarantee the statistical identification of the models, the factorial loadings of one
of the indicators of each latent variable were constrained at 1.00. Because symbolic threat has only one indicator, its error
variance was fixed at 0.005. Results showed very good fit to the data: x2(10, N¼ 33 038)¼ 555.83, p< .001, CFI¼ 1.00,
GFI¼ 1.00, AGFI¼ .99, RMSEA¼ .04, AIC¼ 591.83. Moreover, factorial loadings were high on their respective
factor (loadings varying from 0.45 to 1.00). These results were compared to an alternative measurement model in which
all items loaded on a general factor, meaning that all items can measure only one latent variable. Result for this
model showed a very poor fit to data, x2(14, N¼ 33 038)¼ 29 673.31, p< .001, CFI¼ .72, GFI¼ .80, AGFI¼ .61,
RMSEA¼ .25, AIC¼ 29 701.31. Thus, the proposed measurement model fits better than the alternative one, Dx2(1,
N¼ 33 038)¼ 29 117.48, p< .001. Furthermore, we repeated these analyses in each country and results showed that our
model fits better in all countries (Dx21s> 10.83, p< .001). Therefore, this set of results is sufficiently strong to support the
construct validity of the proposed measurement model.
Mediation Analysis To test the hypothesis that the relationship between prejudice and discrimination is mediated by
both realistic threat and symbolic threat perceptions, we followed the procedures commonly recommended for the analysis4In order to guarantee the statistical identification of the first factorial solution, we constrained at 1.00 the variances of the latent variables. Also, we
constrained at 0.00 the variance of indicator error of the symbolic threat and the two indicators loadings of realistic threat were set equal to each other. The
correlation between the two latent variables was freely estimated. We used the same strategy in the specification of the second factorial solution.
5At the suggestion of a reviewer we examined alternative strategies regarding the error variancewhenwe had only one item tomeasure a latent variable. In
this study and in the subsequent one, we estimated each model constraining at 15% and to 20% the error variance of the single items. Results showed that
neither the unstandardized effects, nor the significance of these effects or even the models’ goodness of fit indices were altered. Only the magnitude of the
standardized effects involving the single item latent variable changed when the error variance was constrained to a value greater than zero, i.e.
standardized effects improved to the extent that these increased the proportion of constrained error variance. Thus, we adopted the most conservative of
the strategies by constraining the single items’ error variance to zero.
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Prejudice and discrimination 1237of mediation within structural equations models (e.g. Kenny & Judd, 1984). As one can see in Figure 1, results show that
the total effect of prejudice on opposition to immigration is strong and significant (b¼ .47, p< .001): The greater the level
of prejudice, the greater the opposition to immigration. The relationship between prejudice and the two types of threat is
also positive and significant: Greater prejudice implies greater perception of realistic and symbolic threat. The effects of
realistic and symbolic threat on opposition to immigration are significant. Finally, the direct effect of prejudice is also
significant. Of greater importance for the mediation test, the analysis of the decomposition of the effects of prejudice on
opposition to immigration indicates that both realistic threat perception (zSobel¼ 39.10, p< .001) and symbolic threat
perception (zSobel¼ 7.62, p< .001) mediated this relationship. However, this effect is far more strongly mediated by
realistic (Mediated Effect¼ .24) than by symbolic threat (Mediated Effect¼ .03). This difference occurs because the
effects of realistic threat on opposition to immigration is significantly stronger than those of symbolic threat (the difference
between the betas is significant, z¼ 35.89, p< .001).
Table 2 presents, for each of the 21 countries, the estimated parameters standardized for the effects of prejudice on the
two types of threat and for the effects of these threats on opposition to immigration. Prejudice significantly predicts the two
types of threat in all countries and realistic threat perception predicts opposition to immigration in all countries. The
relationship between symbolic threat perception and opposition to immigration is, however, only positive and significant
in Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, and Sweden. And, even then, these relationships are very weak.
Table 3 shows the decomposition of the effects of prejudice on opposition to immigration. As we can see, the total effect
of prejudice is significant and greater than that of the direct effect in all countries. Though the direct effect of prejudice on
opposition to immigration continues to be significant in all countries, threat perception partially mediates the relationship
between prejudice and opposition to immigration in all the countries analysed. Furthermore, the analysis of the mediated
effects indicates that realistic threat perception mediates this relationship in all countries. Symbolic threat perception
mediates this relationship only in Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, and Sweden. The relationship between prejudice
and opposition to immigration is thus more strongly mediated by realistic threat perception. This effect appears becauseFigure 1. Standardized maximum likelihood coefficients for the structural equation model depicting the relationship between
prejudice and opposition to immigration, mediated by symbolic and realistic threat perceptions (Study 1). Note: Coefficient in
brackets is the total effect and it was estimated before considering the two mediators in the model. a denotes parameter constrained.
p< .001
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Table 2. Standardized maximum likelihood coefficients estimated for the hypothesized model by country (Study 1)
Country
Prejudice effect on threats
Threat effects on opposition
to immigration Correlation
bP-RT bP-ST bRT-OI bST-OI rRT-ST
Austria .43 .38 .49 .08 .68
Belgium .54 .42 .44 .10 .44
Czech Republic .53 .45 .53 .01 .60
Denmark .45 .39 .46 .07 .69
Finland .48 .41 .40 .10 .44
France .60 .52 .62 .05 .72
Germany .52 .46 .54 .07 .50
Greece .52 .39 .59 .06 .70
Hungary .39 .32 .55 .08 .52
Ireland .43 .37 .49 .01 .62
Italy .38 .26 .42 .07 .55
Luxembourg .37 .21 .45 .06 .55
Netherlands .55 .47 .56 .01 .52
Norway .56 .41 .78 .21 .75
Poland .37 .28 .47 .00 .45
Portugal .50 .35 .48 .05 .73
Slovenia .56 .35 .60 .00 .49
Spain .46 .36 .45 .08 .59
Sweden .49 .41 .47 .08 .57
Switzerland .46 .33 .53 .01 .66
United Kingdom .49 .44 .58 .03 .69
Note: bP-RT¼Prejudice effect on realistic threat; bP-ST¼Prejudice effect on symbolic threat; bRT-OI¼Realistic threat effect on opposition to
immigration; bST-OI¼Symbolic threat effect on opposition to immigration; rRT-ST¼Correlation between realistic and symbolic threats. p< .05;
p< .01; p< .001.
Table 3. Decomposition of the prejudice effects on opposition to immigration by country (Study 1)
Country Total effect
Indirect effects through
Direct effectRealistic threat Symbolic threat
Austria .39 .21 .03 .15
Belgium .52 .24 .04 .24
Czech Republic .53 .27 .00 .26
Denmark .52 .21 .03 .28
Finland .59 .19 .04 .36
France .61 .37 .03 .21
Germany .49 .28 .03 .18
Greece .38 .31 .02 .10
Hungary .43 .21 .02 .24
Ireland .42 .21 .00 .21
Italy .45 .16 .02 .27
Luxembourg .48 .16 .01 .33
Netherlands .45 .31 .00 .14
Norway .55 .42 .09 .21
Poland .36 .18 .00 .17
Portugal .35 .24 .02 .09
Slovenia .42 .34 .00 .09
Spain .42 .21 .03 .18
Sweden .54 .23 .03 .28
Switzerland .45 .24 .01 .20
United Kingdom .53 .28 .01 .26
Note: Indirect effects were calculated according to the Sobel’s Test. p< .05; p< .01; p< .001.
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Prejudice and discrimination 1239the effect of this threat on opposition to immigration is significantly stronger than the effect of symbolic threat (in all
countries, ps< .001).
Goodness-of-fit Analyses of the goodness-of-fit indices for the proposed model (see Figure 1) show very good fit to
the data: x2(9, N¼ 33 038)¼ 266.49, p< .001, CFI¼ 1.00, GFI¼ 1.00, AGFI¼ .99, RMSEA¼ .03, AIC¼ 304.49. We
also compared the fit of this model with the fit of an alternative model where symbolic and realistic threat perceptions were
specified as two correlated latent variables predicting prejudice which in turn predicted opposition to immigration
(Alternative Model 1) and with the fit of another alternative model where opposition to immigration was an antecedent of
both symbolic and realistic threat perceptions (AlternativeModel 2). The fit of AlternativeModel 1 is not as good as that of
the model we propose: x2(11, N¼ 33 038)¼ 7239.73, p< .001, CFI¼ .93, GFI¼ .94, AGFI¼ .86, RMSEA¼ .14,
AIC¼ 7273.73. Likewise, the fit of AlternativeModel 2 is not as good as that of our model: x2(10,N¼ 33 038)¼ 4484.56,
p< .001, CFI¼ .96, GFI¼ .96, AGFI¼ .90, RMSEA¼ .11, AIC¼ 4520.56. Indeed, the model we propose fits the data
better than Alternative Model 1, Dx2(2, N¼ 33 038)¼ 7007.24, p< .001, and Alternative Model 2, Dx2(1,
N¼ 33 038)¼ 4218.07, p< .001. Results also show that the model we propose fits the data better than these alternative
models in all countries (see Table 4). These results therefore indicate that it is empirically more consistent to see threat
perception as a consequence rather than a predictor of prejudice, or as a consequence of discrimination6.
Countries With Different Immigration Policies We carried out a multi-groups analysis to test the hypothesis of model
invariance between countries with different immigration policies (Germany, France and the United Kingdom). In the
baseline, we specified that the structural parameters would be freely estimated between countries. The goodness-of-fit for
this baseline is very good, x2(27, N¼ 5748)¼ 67.28, p< .001, CFI¼ 1.00, GFI¼ 1.00, AGFI¼ .99, RMSEA¼ .02,
AIC¼ 181.28, showing that the proposed model fits the data very well. We then constrained the parameters of the
structural model to assume equality between countries. Results indicate that the fit of the constrained model is also very
good: x2(37, N¼ 5748)¼ 89.62, p< .001, CFI¼ 1.00, GFI¼ 1.00, AGFI¼ .99, RMSEA¼ .02, AIC¼ 183.62. Although
the fit of the unconstrained model is slightly better than the fit of the constrained model, Dx2(10, N¼ 5748)¼ 22.34,
p< .05, the analysis of the goodness-of-fit indices does not enable us to reject the null hypothesis of the model invariance
between countries with different immigration policies.
Discussion
Within the framework of the research on the relationship between prejudice and discrimination, results provided support
for the hypothesis that the effect of prejudice on opposition to immigration is mediated by threat perceptions. These
mediation effects indicate how prejudice leads people to oppose immigration. This means that the greater the participants’
level of prejudice, the greater their opposition to immigration. It also means that part of this effect is transferred through
threat perceptions: The more prejudice, the greater the perception of realistic and symbolic threat, and greater perception
of threat implies greater opposition to immigration. We also showed that the hypothesized model has a better fit than the
alternative model, in which threat perception was specified as a predictor of prejudice. Finally, the results support the
hypothesis that the model does not vary in terms of countries with different immigration policies. Thus, in France,
Germany and the United Kingdom, the relationship between prejudice and opposition to immigration was mediated by
threat perceptions.
Importantly, results also showed that this mediation was stronger in the case of realistic threat, consistent with several
studies that show that attitudes towards immigration are more related to the economic aspects of threat (e.g. Quillian,
1995; Stephan & Stephan, 1996). In fact, while realistic threat mediated the effect of prejudice in all 21 countries,
symbolic threat mediated the same effect in only five countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, and Sweden). Even
in these countries, the mediated effect was very low and smaller than the effect mediated by realistic threat.6Additionally, we carried out an exploratory analysis in order to verify if realistic and symbolic threats could also function as moderators of the
relationship between prejudice and opposition to immigration. Using a multiple regression approach (see Aiken & West, 1991), we found a large
regression coefficient (R¼ .60, p< .001) when only main effects were entered in the model. When interaction terms were added to the model (i.e.:
PrejudiceRealistic threat; PrejudiceSymbolic Threat; SymbolicRealistic threats; PrejudiceSymbolicRealistic threats) the regression’s
coefficient was unchanged (R2change¼ 0.00). We also found unchanged R2 in each country: R2change¼ 0.02 in Austria; R2change¼ 0.01 in Switzerland,
Czech Republic, and Finland; R2change¼ 0.00 in all other countries. Therefore, we can conclude that threat perceptions do not moderate the effect of
prejudice on opposition to immigration in these samples.
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Table 4. Goodness-of-fit indices for the hypothesized and alternative models by country (Study 1)
Country x2 CFI GFI AGFI RMSEA Dx2
Austria
Hypothesized Model (df¼ 9) 30.57 1.00 1.00 .99 .04
Alternative Model 1 (df¼ 11) 462.59 .93 .94 .84 .15 432.02
Alternative Model 2 (df¼ 10) 460.29 .93 .94 .83 .16 429.72
Belgium
Hypothesized Model (df¼ 9) 14.69 1.00 1.00 .99 .02
Alternative Model 1 (df¼ 11) 259.53 .95 .96 .89 .12 244.84
Alternative Model 2 (df¼ 10) 132.44 .97 .98 .94 .09 117.75
Czech Republic
Hypothesized Model (df¼ 9) 17.05 1.00 1.00 .99 .03
Alternative Model 1 (df¼ 11) 134.37 .95 .96 .89 .12 117.32
Alternative Model 2 (df¼ 10) 218.99 .94 .95 .87 .13 201.94
Denmark
Hypothesized Model (df¼ 9) 22.78 1.00 1.00 .99 .03
Alternative Model 1 (df¼ 11) 279.98 .93 .95 .86 .14 257.20
Alternative Model 2 (df¼ 10) 306.15 .93 .94 .84 .15 283.37
Finland
Hypothesized Model (df¼ 9) 31.62 1.00 1.00 .99 .04
Alternative Model 1 (df¼ 11) 319.17 .94 .95 .88 .12 287.55
Alternative Model 2 (df¼ 10) 187.43 .97 .97 .92 .10 155.81
France
Hypothesized Model (df¼ 9) 17.20 1.00 1.00 .99 .03
Alternative Model 1 (df¼ 11) 394.86 .92 .92 .80 .16 377.66
Alternative Model 2 (df¼ 10) 245.59 .95 .95 .86 .14 228.39
Germany
Hypothesized Model (df¼ 9) 37.20 1.00 1.00 .99 .04
Alternative Model 1 (df¼ 11) 582.29 .93 .94 .85 .14 545.09
Alternative Model 2 (df¼ 10) 279.61 .97 .97 .92 .12 242.41
Greece
Hypothesized Model (df¼ 9) 17.98 1.00 1.00 .99 .02
Alternative Model 1 (df¼ 11) 417.51 .95 .95 .88 .13 399.53
Alternative Model 2 (df¼ 10) 717.90 .91 .92 .79 .18 699.92
Hungary
Hypothesized Model (df¼ 9) 7.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 .00
Alternative Model 1 (df¼ 11) 241.89 .94 .96 .89 .12 234.00
Alternative Model 2 (df¼ 10) 235.09 .94 .96 .89 .12 227.20
Ireland
Hypothesized Model (df¼ 9) 12.47 1.00 1.00 .99 .02
Alternative Model 1 (df¼ 11) 308.71 .94 .96 .89 .12 296.24
Alternative Model 2 (df¼ 10) 387.03 .93 .96 .85 .14 374.56
Italy
Hypothesized Model (df¼ 9) 26.44 1.00 .99 .98 .04
Alternative Model 1 (df¼ 11) 207.70 .94 .95 .88 .13 181.26
Alternative Model 2 (df¼ 10) 181.32 .95 .96 .88 .12 154.88
Luxembourg
Hypothesized Model (df¼ 9) 40.53 .99 .99 .96 .06
Alternative Model 1 (df¼ 11) 112.34 .96 .97 .92 .10 71.81
Alternative Model 2 (df¼ 10) 131.11 .95 .96 .89 .12 90.58
Netherlands
Hypothesized Model (df¼ 9) 27.52 1.00 1.00 .99 .03
Alternative Model 1 (df¼ 11) 316.23 .95 .96 .90 .11 288.71
Alternative Model 2 (df¼ 10) 234.08 .96 .97 .92 .10 206.56
Norway
Hypothesized Model (df¼ 9) 41.50 .99 .99 .98 .04
Alternative Model 1 (df¼ 11) 302.91 .94 .95 .89 .12 261.41
Alternative Model 2 (df¼ 10) 328.88 .93 .95 .87 .13 287.38
(Continues)
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Table 4. (Continued)
Country x2 CFI GFI AGFI RMSEA Dx2
Poland
Hypothesized Model (df¼ 9) 43.51 .99 .99 .98 .04
Alternative Model 1 (df¼ 11) 323.34 .94 .96 .89 .12 279.83
Alternative Model 2 (df¼ 9) 256.81 .95 .96 .90 .11 213.30
Portugal
Hypothesized Model (df¼ 9) 29.21 1.00 .99 .98 .04
Alternative Model 1 (df¼ 11) 272.49 .95 .95 .87 .13 243.28
Alternative Model 2 (df¼ 10) 409.34 .93 .93 .80 .17 380.13
Slovenia
Hypothesized Model (df¼ 9) 13.96 1.00 1.00 .99 .02
Alternative Model 1 (df¼ 11) 218.84 .94 .96 .89 .12 204.88
Alternative Model 2 (df¼ 10) 120.23 .97 .98 .93 .09 106.27
Spain
Hypothesized Model (df¼ 9) 68.47 .99 .99 .96 .07
Alternative Model 1 (df¼ 11) 331.76 .94 .94 .86 .14 263.29
Alternative Model 2 (df¼ 10) 296.84 .95 .95 .86 .14 228.37
Sweden
Hypothesized Model (df¼ 9) 95.48 .98 .98 .95 .08
Alternative Model 1 (df¼ 11) 417.65 .92 .94 .84 .15 322.17
Alternative Model 2 (df¼ 10) 323.98 .94 .95 .86 .14 228.50
Switzerland
Hypothesized Model (df¼ 9) 44.90 .99 .99 .98 .05
Alternative Model 1 (df¼ 11) 325.42 .93 .95 .87 .13 280.52
Alternative Model 2 (df¼ 10) 320.88 .93 .95 .86 .14 275.98
United Kingdom
Hypothesized Model (df¼ 9) 12.88 1.00 1.00 .99 .02
Alternative Model 1 (df¼ 11) 440.92 .94 .94 .84 .15 428.04
Alternative Model 2 (df¼ 10) 513.04 .93 .93 .81 .17 500.16
Note: df¼ degree of freedom. Dx2 compares each alternative model with hypothesized model. p< .05 to x2> 16.91; p< .01 to x2> 21.66; p< .001 to
x2> 27.87.
Prejudice and discrimination 1241These results provide initial support to the hypothesis that different types of threat can justify different discriminatory
policies against immigrants. In this sense, the relationship between prejudice and opposition to immigration is more easily
mediated by realistic threat perception because this threat more easily legitimizes opposition to immigration. However,
one might consider that the poor predictive or mediated effect of symbolic threat may be due to the fact that only one item
was used to measure this dimension. Study 2 tries to overcome this limitation using more than one item. In order to carry
out a test of this hypothesis, we conducted a second study where we examined the differential role of realistic and symbolic
threats in the relationship between prejudice, on the one hand, and opposition to immigration and opposition to
naturalization of immigrants on the other hand.
Study 2
The aim of this study was to analyse the mediating role of different justifications in the relationship between prejudice and
different types of discrimination. We used representative samples of the populations of two European countries: Portugal
and Switzerland. These countries have contrasting traditions of migration. Portugal has traditionally been a country of
emigration and has only recently become a destination for immigrants. Switzerland, in contrast, has a long tradition of
immigration. Despite these differences, we tested the hypothesis that the model we propose fits equally well in both
countries. Indeed, the two countries are democratic in form and blatant discrimination is forbidden, requiring justification
for its expression.
As in Study 1, we measured justification in terms of realistic and symbolic threat perceptions. We operationalized
discrimination as two types of support for discriminatory policies: Opposition to immigration and opposition to
naturalization of immigrants. According to our model, if threat perception justifies the relationship between prejudice andCopyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 1231–1250 (2010)
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differentially mediated by realistic and symbolic threat perceptions.
If these different types of threat serve as different justification strategies, then the mediation effects should be stronger
for realistic threat when discrimination is operationalized as opposition to immigration and for symbolic threat
when discrimination is operationalized as opposition to naturalization. Specifically, if symbolic threat perception justifies
discrimination because naturalization threatens the ingroup’s cultural identity and realistic threat perception justifies this
discrimination because it activates the idea that migration flows increase competition for scarce resources, then opposition
to naturalization should be more strongly predicted by symbolic threat perception, while opposition to immigration should
be more strongly predicted by realistic threat perception.
The analysis was carried out in three phases. First, we tested the mediation hypotheses. Second, we compared the fit of
the proposed model with the fit of an alternative model that specified threat perceptions as predictors of prejudice and with
the fit of another alternative model specifying threat perception as a consequence of both opposition to immigration and
opposition to naturalization. In the third phase, we tested the hypothesis that, despite the different traditions concerning
migration phenomena, the mediation role of threat perceptions would hold in both countries, since both Portugal and
Switzerland are democratic countries with strong laws condemning discriminating behaviours.
Method
Participants We used the International Social Survey Programme database (ISSP-2003)7. The Portuguese probabilistic
representative sample was made up of 1602 participants. The data of the 88 participants without Portuguese nationality were
excluded from the analysis, thus leaving data from 1514 participants who represented the Portuguese population aged 15 years
and over. The Swiss sample had 1037 participants. This was reduced, as 97 participants were not Swiss nationals, leaving data
from 940 participants who represented the Swiss population aged 15 years and older.
Prejudice Measure The ISSP questionnaire used in Portugal and Switzerland has one indicator measuring prejudice:
‘Imagine that one of your children had children with someone of a different colour. In other words, imagine that your
grandchild was a different colour from you. Would you have difficulty in accepting this?’ The answers vary from 1 (no
difficulty in accepting) to 4 (great difficulty in accepting), so that higher values indicate greater prejudice. This item is
one of the most traditional examples used in past research to measure blatant prejudice. Pettigrew has successfully used it
since 1958 in USA, and in South Africa (Pettigrew, 1958), as well as in Europe in its current version of the blatant
prejudice scale (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995).
Realistic Threat Measure Realistic threat perception was measured with the following indicators that tap core
features of conceptual definitions for this threat (Esses et al., 1998; Stephan et al., 2002): ‘Immigrants increase crime rates’
(RT-item 1) and ‘Immigrants take jobs away from people working in [country]’ (RT-item 2). Participants indicated their
degree of agreement with each of these items. The answers ranged from 1 (total disagreement) to 5 (total agreement), so
that the highest values indicated greater perception of threat.
Symbolic Threat Measure Symbolic threat perception was measured using the following indicators: ‘Immigrants
improve [country nationality] society by bringing in new ideas and cultures’ (ST-item 1) and ‘Our society would be richer
if we shared customs and traditions with the immigrants’ (ST-item 2). The answers ranged from 1 (total agreement) to
5 (total disagreement). These indicators are in line with the symbolic threat perception definition (see Sears & Henry,
2003; Stephan et al., 2002). By using two items, we are better able to analyse the relationship between this threat and other
variables (comparing with Study 1) since measurement error can now be taken into account.
Opposition to Immigration Measure The ISSP questionnaire has an indicator of opposition to immigration: ‘Do you
think the number of immigrants to [country] nowadays should be...’ The participants’ answers were codified to range from
1 (increased a lot) to 5 (reduced a lot). Higher scores indicate greater opposition to immigration.
Opposition to Naturalization of Immigrants’ Measure Two indicators were used: ‘Children born in [Country], of
foreign parents, should have the right to acquire [Country nationality]’ (ON-item 1) and ‘Children born outside [Country]7The ISSP is an academic and a methodologically rigorous survey about contemporary social issues. The ISSP has carried out a continuing annual
programme of cross-national collaboration on surveys covering social topics.
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The answers ranged from 1 (total agreement) to 5 (total disagreement). Higher scores indicate greater opposition to
naturalization.
Results
Preliminary Analyses Table 5 shows the descriptive statistic and the correlations between the indicators used. The
only non-significant correlation is the one between RT-item 2 (an indicator of realistic threat) and ON-item 2 (an indicator
of opposition to naturalization). All the other correlations are positive and significant. The strongest correlations are
between the items used as indicators of the model’s latent variables.
The correlations between the indicators of different variables are low or moderate, indicating that they are measuring
different constructs avoiding, once more, the problem of multicolinearity. However, similarly to the previous study,
substantial correlations were found between the indicators for symbolic and realistic threat perception. Therefore, we
applied a CFA to the indicators of threat perception, specifying a solution with two correlated latent variables (symbolic
threat and realistic threat). We compared the goodness-of-fit of this solution to that of a unifactorial solution8. As in Study
1, results indicate that the bi-factorial solution has a very good fit, x2(1,N¼ 2411)¼ 40.34, p< .001, CFI¼ .97, GFI¼ .99,
AGFI¼ .92, RMSEA¼ .13, AIC¼ 58.34, with a very strong correlation between the two factors (r¼ .71, p< .001). The
unifactorial solution has an unsatisfactory fit: x2(2, N¼ 2411)¼ 119.41, p< .001, CFI¼ .92, GFI¼ .98, AGFI¼ .88,
RMSEA¼ .16, AIC¼ 135.72. In fact, the bi-factorial solution fits the data better than the unifactorial model: Dx2(1,
N¼ 2411)¼ 79.07, p< .001. Therefore, the solution specifying symbolic threat perception as a different latent variable
from realistic threat perception is more appropriate than the solution that specifies both threat perceptions as just one
factor.
We also analysed the construct validity of our measurement model specified with five conceptual latent variables (i.e.
prejudice, realistic threat, symbolic threat, opposition to immigration and opposition to naturalization) that were allowed
to correlate. In order to ensure the statistical identification of the models, the factorial loadings of one of the indicators of
each latent variable were constrained at 1.00. Because prejudice has only one indicator, its error variance was constrained
at 0.00. CFA results showed large factorial loadings for each item on their respective factor (loadings varying from 0.47 to
1.00) and a very good fit to the data: x2(12, N¼ 2411)¼ 105.31, p< .001, CFI¼ .97, GFI¼ .99, AGFI¼ .97,Table 5. Means, standard deviations and correlation matrix of the items used in Study 2
Items M SD
Correlation matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Prejudice item (1) 1.61 .88
Realistic threat
RT-item 1 (2) 3.40 1.08 .21
RT-item 2 (3) 3.04 1.17 .19 .36
Symbolic threat
ST-item 1 (4) 2.45 .96 .24 .31 .36
ST-item 2 (5) 2.35 .88 .26 .30 .21 .47
Opposition to immigration
OI-item (6) 3.63 .84 .24 .39 .40 .40 .34
Opposition to naturalization
ON-item 1 (7) 1.90 .93 .23 .16 .14 .28 .29 .24
ON-item 2 (8) 1.82 .79 .07 .11 .00 .16 .20 .11 .43
Note: Correlation matrix’s diagonal was omitted. All coefficients are significant at p< .001, except between (3) and (8).
8In order to guarantee the statistical identification of the first factorial solution, we constrained at 1.00 set the variances of the latent variables, resulting in
an over-identified model to be tested with one degree of freedom. For the unifactorial solution, we constrained at 1.00 set the variance of the factor,
resulting in a solution with two degrees of freedom.
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1244 Cı́cero Pereira et al.RMSEA¼ .05, AIC¼ 153.31. As in Study 1, we compared this model to an alternative measurement model in which all
items measure only one latent variable. Results for this model showed a poor fit to the data, x2(20, N¼ 2411)¼ 659.13,
p< .001, CFI¼ .81, GFI¼ .94, AGFI¼ .88, RMSEA¼ .12, AIC¼ 691.13. Hence, our measurement model fits better than
the alternative one, Dx2(8, N¼ 2411)¼ 653.82, p< .001. Importantly, furthermore, our model fits better both in Portugal
(Dx28¼ 375.86, p< .001) and in Switzerland (Dx28> 136.68, p< .001). In sum, CFA’s results support the validity of our
measurement model.
Mediation Analysis Results show that the total effects of prejudice on opposition to immigration and to naturalization
are significant (see Figure 2). The relationships between prejudice and the two types of threat are positive and significant.
Realistic threat perception significantly predicts opposition to immigration, but is not related to opposition to
naturalization. By contrast, symbolic threat perception significantly predicts both opposition to immigration and
opposition to naturalization. The direct effect of prejudice on opposition to naturalization is significant, but the effect on
opposition to immigration is not. In both cases, the direct effects of prejudice are smaller than the total effects, suggesting
the possibility of mediated effects.
The analysis of the decomposition of the effects of prejudice on opposition to immigration indicates that both realistic
threat (zSobel¼ 6.87, p< .001) and symbolic threat perception (zSobel¼ 3.48, p< .001) mediate this effect. This effect is,
however, more strongly mediated by realistic threat (Mediated Effect¼ .16) than by symbolic threat (Mediated
Effect¼ .07). This difference occurs because the effect of realistic threat on opposition to immigration is significantly
stronger than that of symbolic threat (z¼ 2.64, p< .01). The decomposition of the effects of prejudice on opposition to
naturalization indicates that only symbolic threat mediates this relationship (zSobel¼ 6.97, p< .001). In fact, the mediated
effect by symbolic threat (Mediated Effect¼ .18) is stronger than the effect mediated by realistic threat (Mediated
Effect¼.02). This occurs because the effect of symbolic threat on opposition to naturalization is stronger than the effectFigure 2. Standardized maximum likelihood coefficients for the structural equation model depicting the relationship between
prejudice and opposition to immigration and opposition to naturalization, mediated by symbolic and realistic threat perceptions
(Study 2). Note: Coefficients in brackets are total effects and they were estimated before considering the two mediators in the model.
a denotes parameter constrained. p< .001
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bP-RT bP-ST bRT-OI bST-OI bRT-ON bST-ON rRT-ST
Portugal .29 .37 .39 .27 .09 .41 .61
Switzerland .30 .31 .74 .19 .02 .50 .72
Note: bP-RT¼Prejudice effect on realistic threat; bP-ST¼Prejudice effect on symbolic threat; bRT-OI¼Realistic threat effect on opposition to
immigration; bST-OI¼Symbolic threat effect on opposition to immigration; bRT-ON¼Realistic threat effect on opposition to naturalization; bST-
ON¼Symbolic threat effect on opposition to naturalization; rRT-ST¼Correlation between realistic and symbolic threats. p< .05; p< .01; p< .001.
Prejudice and discrimination 1245of the realistic threat (z¼ 5.37, p< .001). In fact, the mediated effect of realistic threat is not significant
(zSobel¼1.47, ns.).
The parameters estimated in each country are presented in Table 6. As we can see, both in Switzerland and in Portugal,
prejudice significantly predicts realistic and symbolic threat perceptions. The effect of realistic threat on opposition to
immigration is strong, while the effect of symbolic threat is weak, but significant in the two countries. The effect of
realistic threat on opposition to naturalization is not significant, while the effect of symbolic threat is strong in both
countries.
Table 7 shows the decomposition of the effects of prejudice on opposition to immigration and on opposition to
naturalization. In Portugal, the effect on opposition to immigration was mediated both by realistic threat and by symbolic
threat. The mediated effect of realistic threat perception was, however, stronger than the one of symbolic threat perception.
This occurred because the effect of realistic threat on opposition to immigration is significantly greater than the effect of
symbolic threat (z¼ 2.64, p< .01).
The prejudice effect on opposition to naturalization was only mediated by symbolic threat. The difference is due to the
fact that the effect of symbolic threat on opposition to naturalization is significantly greater than the effect of realistic
threat (z¼ 4.09, p< .001). In Switzerland, opposition to immigration was only mediated by realistic threat perception.
Concerning opposition to naturalization, only the effect mediated by symbolic threat is significant.
Goodness-of-fit Analysis of the goodness-of-fit indices shows that the proposed model (see Figure 2) fits the data very
well: x2(13, N¼ 2411)¼ 119.35, p< .001, CFI¼ .97, GFI¼ .99, AGFI¼ .97, RMSEA¼ .06, AIC¼ 165.35. As in Study
1, we compared the fit of the proposed model with the fit of an alternative model where symbolic and realistic threat
perceptions were specified as two correlated latent variables predicting prejudice that, in turn, predicts opposition to
immigration and opposition to naturalization (AlternativeModel 1) and alsowith the fit of another alternativemodel where
opposition to immigration and opposition to naturalization were specified as antecedents of symbolic and realistic threat
perceptions (Alternative Model 2). Alternative Model 1 has a very poor fit, x2(17, 2411)¼ 1108.26, p< .001, CFI¼ .68,
GFI¼ .90, AGFI¼ .79, RMSEA¼ .16, AIC¼ 1146.26, and the fit of Alternative Model 2 is not as good as that of ourTable 7. Decomposition of the prejudice effects on opposition to immigration and to naturalization by country (Study 2)
Country Total effects
Indirect effects through
Direct effectRealistic threat Symbolic threat
Portugal
Opposition to immigration .23 .11 .09 .03
Opposition to naturalization .31 .02 .15 .18
Switzerland
Opposition to immigration .22 .22 .01 .01
Opposition to naturalization .25 .06 .16 .04
Note: Indirect effects were calculated according to the Sobel’s Test. p< .001.
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Table 8. Goodness-of-fit indices for the hypothesized and alternative models by country (Study 2)
Country x2 CFI GFI AGFI RMSEA Dx2
Portugal
Hypothesized Model (df¼ 13) 55.36 .98 .99 .97 .05
Alternative Model 1 (df¼ 17) 512.64 .75 .92 .83 .14 457.28
Alternative Model 2 (df¼ 14) 163.57 .93 .97 .93 .09 108.21
Switzerland
Hypothesized Model (df¼ 13) 33.37 .99 .99 .97 .04
Alternative Model 1 (df¼ 17) 595.01 .61 .86 .69 .20 561.64
Alternative Model 2 (df¼ 14) 169.70 .90 .96 .88 .11 136.33
Note. df¼ degrees of freedom. The Dx2 compares each alternative model with the hypothesized model. All x2 values are significant with p< .001.
1246 Cı́cero Pereira et al.model, x2(14, N¼ 2411)¼ 376.82, p< .001, CFI¼ .90, GFI¼ .96, AGFI¼ .91, RMSEA¼ .10, AIC¼ 420.82. Also
replicating Study 1’s results, our model fits the data better than the Alternative Model 1, Dx2(4, 2411)¼ 988.92, p< .001,
and better than the AlternativeModel 2,Dx2(1,N¼ 2411)¼ 257.47, p< .001. Furthermore, results show that the proposed
model fits the data better than the alternative models both in Portugal and Switzerland (see Table 8). Therefore, these
results reinforce empirical evidence already presented in Study 1, indicating that it is empirically more consistent to
construe threat perception as a consequence of prejudice, rather than as its predictor, or as a consequence of
discrimination9.
Comparing Countries We carried out multi-group analyses to test the hypothesis of model invariance between
Switzerland and Portugal. In the baseline, we specified that the structural parameters of the model would be freely
estimated between countries. The fit for this baseline is very good: x2(26, N¼ 2411)¼ 88.73, p< .001, CFI¼ 98,
GFI¼ .99, AGFI¼ .97, RMSEA¼ .03, AIC¼ 180.73. We then constrained the structural parameters to equality between
the countries. Results indicate that the constrained model’s fit is also very good: x2(34, N¼ 2411)¼ 127.35, p< .001,
CFI¼ .97, GFI¼ .99, AGFI¼ .97, RMSEA¼ .04, AIC¼ 203.55. Although the fit of the unconstrained model is slightly
better than the fit of the constrained model: Dx2(8, N¼ 2411)¼ 38.61, p< .001, the analysis of the fit indices does not
enable us to reject the null hypothesis that the proposed model is invariant between countries.
Discussion
Based on representative data of the populations of two European countries with different traditions of immigration
(Portugal and Switzerland), this study tested the general hypothesis that the relationship between prejudice and
discrimination is mediated by perceptions that justify discrimination. In general, results offered support for the main
hypothesis that two types of threat would mediate the effect of prejudice on discrimination. In the case of opposition to
immigration, the effect of prejudice was more strongly predicted by realistic than by symbolic threat perception, thus
replicating the results of Study 1. Results also showed that the proposed model fits better than the alternative model.
Finally, we showed that our model fits the data very well in the two samples analysed. These results show that the proposed
model is just as applicable in a country traditionally receptive of immigrants as in a country that just recently became a
preferred destination for several immigrant groups. What these countries have in common is the fact that they are
democratic and have passed laws that strongly punish discrimination, conditions that we deem as sufficient for the
application of the justified discrimination model (Pereira et al., 2009).General Discussion
We presented two studies using methodologically rigorous databases of probabilistic representative samples from
21 European countries that tested the hypothesis that the relationship between prejudice and discrimination is mediated by9As in Study 1, exploratory analyses were carried out to verify if realistic and symbolic threats could be moderators of the relationship between prejudice
and opposition to immigration as well as opposition to naturalization.We obtained the same pattern of results as reported for Study 1, indicating that threat
perceptions do not moderate the effect of prejudice neither on opposition to immigration nor on opposition to naturalization.
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Prejudice and discrimination 1247perceptions that can serve to legitimize discriminatory actions. Discrimination was operationalized as opposition to
immigration and opposition to the naturalization of immigrants. Justifications were measured based on realistic and
symbolic threat perceptions. CFA’s results showed strong support for the construct validity of the indicators used to
measure these variables. Moreover, the results of the two studies confirmed our hypotheses. In the first study, the
relationship between prejudice and opposition to immigration was mediated by realistic threat and symbolic threat
perceptions. We furthermore showed that the mediation by realistic threat was stronger than that by symbolic threat
perception. To provide further support for the hypothesis that different types of threats are differently used as justifications
depending on the type of discriminatory behaviour, we conducted a second study using representative samples of two
European countries with different traditions of immigration. Results of this second study replicated the main results
obtained in the first study and, more importantly, corroborated the hypothesis that the relationship between prejudice and
opposition to immigration is more strongly mediated by realistic threat perception, while the effect of prejudice on
opposition to naturalization—defined as a more identity-based aspect of discrimination—was exclusively mediated by
symbolic threat perception. Additionally, in all samples, our model was shown to fit the data better than an alternative
model that specifies threat perceptions as predictors of prejudice. Therefore, we can argue that it is more probable that
prejudice leads to a threat perception than the other way around, which provides us with a supplementary empirical
argument for the idea that threat, in fact, mediates the relationship between prejudice and the support of discriminatory
policies against immigrants.
Concerning opposition to immigration, results are coherent with the empirical evidence developed within theories
depicting real conflicts of interests (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966), since attitudes
towards immigration are, for the general public and the media, mainly associated with competition for scarce resources
and security-related issues (e.g. Quillian, 1995; Stephan et al., 2002; Vala et al., 2006), which are the major components of
realistic threat. Concerning opposition to naturalization, the effects presented here seem closer to the literature on the
impact of identity processes on intergroup hostility, namely the literature on the role of social identity in these processes
(e.g. Branscombe et al., 1999; Ullrich et al., 2006). In fact, these processes are commonly associated with symbolic threat
perception (e.g. Sears & Henry, 2003; Stephan et al., 2002; Vala et al., 2006; Zárate, Garcia, Garza, & Hitlan, 2004).
Our proposal goes beyond these earlier studies insofar as it shows that these relationships indicate a legitimizing
process of discrimination. In this sense, the model we propose contributes to the understanding of how prejudice leads to
discrimination. The model explains, more specifically, how prejudice leads people to reject immigration and the
naturalization of immigrants. In fact, results show that the greater the level of prejudice, the greater the opposition (to
immigration and to the naturalization of immigrants). In this sense, people are opposed to immigration to the extent that
they can justify their discrimination based on the idea that immigrants represent an economic and security threat.
Individuals are against naturalization to the extent that they can justify their discrimination based on the belief that
immigrants are a threat to the lifestyle, values and the very identity of the host country members. Furthermore, our results
showed that threat perceptions may be not only a consequence of prejudice and an antecedent of discrimination, but more
importantly that they play a central role in the psychological process of legitimization.
The model also contributes to a greater specification regarding the relationships between the variables considered
herein. First, we clearly distinguish three types of variables: prejudice, threat perception and support for discriminatory
policies. This distinction has not been presented clearly in the literature about the effect of threat on prejudice (e.g., Esses
et al., 2001; Zagefka, Brown, Broquard, & Martin, 2007). Second, the model organizes these variables based on the
hypothesis that there is a process that runs from prejudice to discrimination, and that this process is mediated by threat
perception. Third, although the relationships observed between the variables of this model have already been studied by a
large number of authors, no one had as yet proposed a model construing these relationships in terms of legitimizing
mechanisms. Although similar ideas are present in the model proposed by Sidanius and Pratto (1999), namely in its
application to attitudes towards immigration (e.g., Pratto & Lemieux, 2001), the model by Sidanius and Pratto (1999)
attributes a legitimizing role to threat within the relationship between the motivation to dominate and discrimination, while
our model places it within the framework of the relationship between prejudice and discrimination.
Although the results reported here support our hypotheses, these studies have an important limitation: Its correlational
nature. The correlational design weakens the evidence in support of the direction of the relationship between prejudice and
threat perceptions. In fact, the estimated parameters do not show causal relationships. Those parameters are only estimated
covariances depicting the relationships between the variables. These results, however, support both approaches, showing
that both mechanisms are possible, i.e. the more classical idea according to which threat can predict prejudice (e.g., EssesCopyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 1231–1250 (2010)
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1248 Cı́cero Pereira et al.et al., 1998; Schlueter et al., 2008; Stephan et al., 2002) as well as the other hypothesis according to which prejudice can
cause perceptions of threat, an hypothesis that has also been experimentally supported in previous work (e.g. Pereira et al.,
2009). As Stephan et al. (2002) argued, the fact that the path from threat to prejudice has been experimentally established
‘does not rule out the existence of the opposite causal relationship’ (p. 1252). Even though our analysis has been based on
correlations, the fact that we demonstrate that the feeling of threat derives from prejudice provides a new perspective to
look at the relationship between prejudice and threat perception. This result is perhaps the most novel and the most
controversial of our results and therefore may have important implications for the study of attitudes towards immigration.
Moreover, our studies can contribute to the literature on prejudice and discrimination in several domains: (a) On the
prejudice-discrimination relationship, that still lacks a consistent theory to explain ‘how’ and ‘when’ this relationship
occurs, (b) on the legitimizing processes, by focusing on the role of justifying factors on discriminatory behaviour, (c) on
threat perceptions, by describing the functions of symbolic and realistic threats as legitimizing factors of the relationship
between prejudice and discrimination and (d) on the understanding of why discrimination still persists nowadays despite
the social and legal norms condemning it. The fundamental idea shown here concerns the (mediational) role of threat
perception specifying indirect ways through which prejudice prompts justified discrimination in democratic societies, and
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